Constitutional Law - Civil Rights by Nerone, Frank Regan & Latella, John W.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 3 Number 2 Article 12 
1965 
Constitutional Law - Civil Rights 
Frank Regan Nerone 
John W. Latella 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frank R. Nerone & John W. Latella, Constitutional Law - Civil Rights, 3 Duq. L. Rev. 283 (1965). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol3/iss2/12 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
RECENT DECISIONS
Van Dusen explains some of the problems involved in section
1404 (a) but due to the infrequent litigation in the area, it may be
in the far distant future before these remaining problems are
answered.
JAMES KIRK
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Civil Rights--Public Accommodations Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348
(1964).
On June 19, 1963, the late President Kennedy called for civil rights
legislation in a message to Congress to which he attached a proposed
bill. Its stated purpose was:
. . . to promote the general welfare, by eliminating dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin
in... public accommodations through the exercise by Con-
gress of the powers conferred upon it ... to enforce the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, to
regulate commerce among the several states, and to make
laws necessary and proper to execute the powers conferred
upon it by the Constitution.'
After a year of deliberation, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.2
TITLE H OF THE ACT - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMI-
NATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION 3 was attacked by the
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., as being unconstitutional. Plaintiff was
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The United
States counterclaimed for the Act's enforcement. The District Court 4
upheld the constitutionality of the public accommodations section and
issued a permanent injunction on the counterclaim. The case came
1. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348, 351 (1964).
2. P.L. 88-352; 78 Stat. 241.
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6.
4. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ga.
1964); under § 206(b) of the Act, the Attorney General made a request that
a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the case.
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to the Supreme Court on admissions and stipulated facts. 5 Prior to
the passage of the Act, the motel had followed a practice of refusing
to rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue
to do so. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court 6 which
held that Title 11 of the Act 7 was within the power of the commerce
clause s and that it did not violate the fifth amendment or the thir-
teenth amendment of the Constitution.
The initial problem faced by the Court was to overcome the estab-
lished precedent of the Civil Rights Cases9 which held the public
accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 187510 unconsti-
tutional. The Civil Rights Cases were distinguished by the fact that
Congress, in enacting the legislation, did not rely upon the commerce
clause." I Therefore, the Civil Rights Cases were not relevant in the
decision of this case.
The Court did not elaborate on the question of how discrimination
in public accommodations obstructs and burdens interstate commerce,
but it was stated that "the voluminous testimony presents overwhelm-
ing evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes inter-
state travel."' 1 2 However, the Government's brief expresses a more
elaborate coverage of the effect of discrimination in public accom-
modations on interstate commerce.' 3 Their argument can be summed
up in that discrimination in public accommodations impedes inter-
state commerce by (1) depriving the market place of a consumer,
and (2) causing protests and demonstrations by discontented
Negroes, the effect of which results in fewer consumers and travelers
engaging in interstate commerce.
5. Appellant owns and operates a motel of 216 rooms which are available
to transient guests in an area which s assessible to interstate and state high-
ways. Seventy-five per cent of the motel's guests are from out of state.
6. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348 (1964).
7. See statute cited note 3 supra.
8. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
9. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10. 18 Stat. 335, 336.
11. See note 8 supra. The Court, in the Civil Rights Cases stated:
"Of course, these remarks [as to lack of congressional power] do not
apply to those cases in which Congress is clothed with direct and plenary
powers of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with an ex-
press or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regulation
of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes. . . . In these cases Congress has power to pass laws
for regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and
transactions of individuals in respect thereof." 109 U.S. 3, 18.
12. See note 6 at 355 supra.
13. Appellee's brief p. 23-38.
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The Supreme Court has held in previous decisions 14 that Congress
has the power within the commerce clause to regulate the movement
of people in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court in Hoke v.
United State8,' 5 referring to the "intercourse" which Chief Justice
Marshall used in Gibbons v. Ogden16 to define commerce stated that
it "... includes the transportation of persons and property."' 7
The Court met the contention that the Act's main purpose is to
regulate moral wrongs rather than commerce by stating:
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many
of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. In
framing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing with
what is considered a moral problem. But that fact does not
detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive
effect that racial discrimination had had on commercial
intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress
to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the
exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the
fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce
with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and
social wrong.18
Appellant contended that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
violates the fifth' 9 and thirteenth 20 amendments of the United States
Constitution. The Court rejected both of these contentions.
14. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916); Hoke v. United States,
227 U.S. 308 (1913); Passenger cases (Smith v. Turner), 7 How. 283, 12 L. Ed.
702 (1849).
15. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
16. 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). The Chief Justice said:
"The subject to be regulated is commerce: and . . . to ascertain the
extent the power it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word
. . . it is intercourse . . . between nations, and parts of nations, in
all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on
that intercourse." [At 189-190]
17. See note 15 at 320 supra.
18. See note 1 at 357-358 supra; Accord, Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S.
308 (1912), where the commerce clause was utilized to regulate prostitution;
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925), criminal enterprises; Boynton v.
Comm. of Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), racial discrimination in terminal restau-
rants; Compare, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and N.L.R.B. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, (1937), where the power of Congress
over interstate commerce was held to extend to those intrastate activities which
so affect interstate commerce as to make regulation of them appropriate means
to the attainment of a legitimate end.
19. Appellant's Brief p. 51.
20. Id. at 54.
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The Court, in rejecting the appellant's fifth amendment argument,
pointed out that thirty-two states presently have public accommoda-
tion statutes, 2 1 which have been held valid under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 2 Therefore, a similar regula-
tion by the federal government is not a violation of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The Court said: "The authority of
the Federal Government over interstate commerce does not differ in
extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate
commerce." 2 3 Nor did the Court give merit to the contention that
the Act is a taking of property without just compensation. 24 The
Court discarded the thirteenth amendment argument as not being
"akin to African slavery." 25
The majority opinion as expressed by Justice Clark, found no need
to discuss the possibility that Title II of the Act may be upheld on
the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated:
This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which
it acted was not adequate, the question upon which we do
21. The following states have enacted public accommodation laws: Alaska
Stats. §§ 11.60.230-1160.240 (1962); Calif. Civil Code §§ 51-54 (1954); Colo. Rev.
Stats. §§ 25-1-1 to 25-2-5 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stats. Ann. § 53-35 (1961); Del.
Code Ann. Tit. 6, c. 45 (1963); Idaho Code, §§ 18-7301 through 18-7303 (1961);
Ill. Ann. Stats. (Smith-Hurd ed.) c. 38, §§ 13-1 to 13-4 (1961), c. 43, § 133 (1944);
Ind. Stats. Ann. (Burns' ed.) §§ 10-901 to 10-914 (1961) ; Iowa Code Ann. §§ 735.1-
735.2 (1950); Kan. Gen. Stats. Ann. § 21-2424 (Supp. 1962); Maine Rev. Stats.
c. 137, § 50 (1954); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 49B § 11 (1964); Mass. Ann. Laws,
c. 140, §§ 5 and 8 (1957), v. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (1963); Mich. Stats. Ann. §§ 28.343
and 28.344 (1962); Minn. Stats. Ann. § 327.09 (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Tit. 64,
§ 211 (1962); Neb. Rev. Stats. c. 20, §§ 101 and 102 (1954); N.H. Rev. Stats. Ann.
c. 354, §§ 1,2,4 and 5 (1963); N.J. Stats. Ann. Tit. 10, §§ 1-2 to 1-7; Tit. 18,
§§ 25-1 to 25-6 (1963); N.M. Stats. Ann. §§ 49-8-1 to 49-8-6 (1963); N.Y. Civil
Rights Law (McKinney's ed.), Art. 4 §§ 40,41 (1946); Executive Law, Art. 15,
§§ 290-301 (1964); Penal Law, Art. 46, §§ 513-515 (1944); N. Dak. Cont. Code,
§ 12-22-30 (1963); Ohio Rev. Code (Pages ed.), §§ 2901.35 and 2901.36 (1954);
Oreg.' Rev. Stats. §§ 30.670, 30.675, 30.680 (1963); Penn. Stats. Ann. Tit. 18,
§ 4654 (1963); R.I. Gen. Laws, §§ 11-24-1 to 11-24-6 (1956); S. Dak. Sess. Laws,
c. 58 (1963); Vt. Stats. Ann. Tit. 13, §§ 1451, 1452 (1958); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 49.60.010 to 49.60.170, 9.91.010 (1962); Wis. Stats. Ann. § 942.04 (1958);
Wyo Stats. Ann. §§ 6-83.1, 6-83.2 (1963).
22. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948); The Court in
Heart of Atlanta said: "... the constitutionality of each state statutes stands
unquestioned" [at 3591.
23. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569 (1939).
24. The Court states that case law is to the contrary. See Legal Tender
cases, 12 Wall 457, 20 L. Ed. 287 (1871); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 502 (1923); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155 (1958).
25. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
[Vol. 3: p. M8.
RECENT DECISIONS
not pass, but merely that since the commerce power is suffi-
cient for our decision here we have considered it alone. 26
Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion was "somewhat reluctant
... to rest solely on the Commerce Clause."2 7 He contended that the
fourteenth amendment could be upheld as appropriate to the end of
enforcing Title II of the Act. In another concurring opinion 28 Jus-
tice Goldberg stated that the primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act
was to protect the personal dignity of man, which necessitates equal
access to public accommodations. And Congress clearly had the
authority under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to enact the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This case clearly resolves any doubt as to congressional power to
regulate discrimination in public accommodations as it affects inter-
state commerce. In addition, it left open the question whether Con-
gress could legislate against discrimination in public accommodations
per se. Although the majority of the Court did not support this deci-
sion on the fourteenth amendment, their language indicates that
absent the commerce power they may have done so. The concurring
opinions of Justices Douglas and Goldberg would have supported the
decision on both the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment.
In order to support the Civil Rights Act of 1964 entirely on the four-
teenth amendment would have necessitated the overruling of the
Civil Rights Cases. The effects of a decision supported exclusively by
the fourteenth amendment would facilitate Congress to take greater
strides in the movement to protect civil rights in the area of public
accommodations. Heart of Atlanta is an intermediate step for such
a decision.
FRANK REGAN NERONE and JOHN W. LATELLA
26. See note 1 at 354 supra.
27. Id. at 369.
28. Id. at 375-377.
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